A basic primer on "de novo" versus "abuse of discretion" judicial analysis

We are exploring the “discretion” scam which infects ERISA law, and how it unduly stacks the deck in favor of insurance companies when you take them to court. I thought an illustration of how big a difference it makes might be useful here, so join me in a review of two recent cases from United States Circuit Courts of Appeal: the Seventh Circuit’s Krolnik v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, which is reported at 570 F.3d 841 (7th Cir. 2009), and the Eleventh Circuit’s Doyle v. Liberty Life Insurance Company of Boston, which is reported at 542 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).

One of the big problems with ERISA exemplified by these cases is that the whole concept of a “standard of review,” which is what courts apply to decide whether to overturn the decision of some other body, is a complete mismatch when you’re talking about an insurance company denying your claim. Traditionally the “other body” is one of two things. They are either a lower court or administrative agency, which, say what you want about them, are at least conceptually impartial and have no direct, personal stake in the decision they are rendering. Or they are a trustee vested by a trustor with discretion to bring to bear their own judgment in making decisions about how trust assets are to be distributed. A classic trustee is also impartial, but sometimes trustees have conflicts of interest, which is legal as long as the trustor was OK with it, and which is taken into account by courts. More about that in a later post.

An insurance company, on the other hand, is a party to the insurance contract in question, which is accused of breaching that contract. In a breach of contract case, the court is supposed to decide for itself whether one of the parties is in breach, not have a thumb on the scale in favor of the breaching party as if it were itself a lower court which has already endorsed the decision it made.

Krolnik discusses “de novo” review, where the court does not grant “deference” to the insurance company, and describes the problem with “standards of review” as applied to an insurance company:

Then there is a dispute about whether Krolnik can work even with all of his physical and mental problems. Some physicians say yes, others no. If judicial review were deferential, then Prudential’s decision would be sustained easily. But the court must make an independent decision. To do this, the finder of fact must weigh all of the medical evidence. ... If a paper record contains a material dispute, a trial is essential. And at trial Krolnik would be free to offer medical evidence of his own and cross-examine the physicians who produced the reports that underlie Prudential’s decision. ....

All in all, it would be best for judges and lawyers to stop thinking about “de novo review” – with the implication that the judge is “reviewing” someone else’s action – and start thinking about independent decision....

So that’s how at least one court thinks a so-called “de novo review” should proceed: it’s not a “review” at all, in the sense that some other impartial body has made a decision; it’s a wholly independent decision by a judge in the first instance.

But of course that’s not how ERISA generally works. For a flavor of that, let’s take a look at Doyle, in which the Eleventh Circuit described how so-called “abuse of discretion review” works. In pertinent part:

(1) Apply the de novo standard to determine whether the claim administrator’s benefits-denial decision is “wrong" (i.e. the court disagrees with the administrator’s decision); if it is not, then end the inquiry and affirm the decision.

OK, so the Eleventh Circuit asks whether the insurance company was wrong to deny benefits. If the insurance company was right, it wins. Fair enough. But does it lose if it was wrong? You would think so, but not necessarily:

(2) If the administrator’s decision is in fact “de novo wrong,” then determine whether he was vested with discretion in reviewing claims, if not, end judicial inquiry and reverse the decision.

Well, at least as long as the insurance company was not “vested with discretion,” then if it is wrong it loses. So far so good. But as we have seen insurance companies almost always vest themselves with discretion when they write their ERISA policies, so we go to the next stage, which is where things get screwy:

(3) If the administrator’s decision is “de novo wrong” and he was vested with discretion in reviewing claims, then determine whether “reasonable” grounds supported it (hence, review his decision under the more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard).

Wait ... what was that? If the decision was wrong then do what? After paying some lip service to the effect of a conflict on interest on the insurance company’s part (more on that later), the Eleventh Circuit goes on to say a decision which was, you know, wrong is nonetheless to be upheld if it was “reasonable.”

And when we get to a discussion a bit later on of what it takes to be considered reasonable “reasonable,” your head might really explode.

And you may very well have a very difficult time getting your insurance company to pay for the repair work.